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Abstract 
Emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) are rapidly increasing their foreign direct 
investment around the world and, in particular, in the countries of Southern Europe. Although, 
international business scholars have been quick to put the spotlight on this new phenomenon, the 
cultural adaptation of EMNE subsidiaries to host-country environments, especially those of Europe, 
has remained largely unexamined. This question acquires particular relevance owing to the 
considerable cultural distance between emerging and developed economies and the isomorphic 
conflicts that can arise at the subsidiary level. Here, we examine this situation by reporting two case 
studies of Chinese subsidiaries operating in Spain. Our findings suggest that guanxi – the deep-rooted 
system of personal relations and social connections founded on mutual interests – plays a major role in 
the search for legitimacy undertaken by Chinese subsidiaries located in Southern Europe. The 
adoption and adaptation of Chinese cultural values and practices to the local environment allow the 
subsidiary to align itself with the culture of the parent organization at the same time as it embeds itself 
in the host environment, thus resolving any isomorphic conflicts. 
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The rise of emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) is a recent phenomenon that 
is gaining in significance in the international business field. Not only are these companies, 
with their origins in emerging countries, able to compete effectively in their home markets, 
but they are also investing successfully in the most advanced economies, the birth place of 
many of the world’s leading players. Indeed, the growth of EMNEs is clearly evidenced in 
terms of foreign direct investment (FDI). According to UNCTAD (2015), the share of global 
FDI outflows from emerging economies has increased from 5% in 1990 to 14% in 2004 and 
39% in 2014. Moreover, an increasing number of EMNEs appear in Fortune’s ranking of the 
world’s 500 largest companies: in 2005 47 EMNEs were listed, in 2013 the number had risen 
dramatically to 132, reaching 158 in 2015, representing 32% of the Global 500.  
Among the countries of Southern Europe, Spain was ranked 12th in the list of global FDI 
inflows (UNCTAD, 2015) with a total of 18,249 million euros, that is 18.68%, originating 
from emerging economies. Indeed, Spanish FDI inward stock from emerging countries has 
risen dramatically by 159.90% in just six years (2007-2013). Consequently, investments in 
Spain from emerging economies are clearly on the upturn, with an average growth rate of 
26.65%, compared to just 1.57% in all other foreign countries. In this regard, Latin America is 
gradually being pushed aside by Asia, whose share of total stock has risen from 1.53% to 
20.06% in only six years. In fact, in the latest Fortune 500, China had 92 (106 if we include 
Hong Kong and Taiwan) of the world’s 500 largest corporations by revenue. 
This rise of EMNEs has aroused considerable interest among academics, resulting in a broad 
range of empirical studies and theoretical works aimed at analysing their characteristics, 
determinants, pathways and performance (Buckley et al. 2007; Child and Rodrigues 2005; 
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Cuervo-Cazurra 2007; Gammeltoft et al. 2010; Guillén and García-Canal 2009; Luo and Tung 
2007; Mathews 2006; Ramamurti 2009). Against this backdrop, a number of specific 
questions arise concerning the Spanish context, most notably: What is the degree of 
penetration of EMNEs, particularly Chinese EMNEs, in Spain? How do Chinese firms 
interact with the Spanish host-environment in adapting to a new distant market? The aim of 
this paper therefore is to use micro-data to determine the extent of the Chinese presence in 
Spain and to adopt a qualitative approach in order to examine the cultural adaptation of 
Chinese subsidiaries to the host country. This latter question is of particular relevance, 
especially given the paucity of studies conducted to date examining issues of cultural fit and 
despite its obvious importance to the success of FDI. Chinese FDI has, on the other hand, 
been the subject of a number of studies, including analyses of how Chinese subsidiaries 
address their disadvantages in developed countries (Klossek et al. 2012; Si and Liefner 2014; 
Wong 2012), the factors that determine the decision-making autonomy of Chinese 
subsidiaries in Germany (Schüler-Zou et al. 2013) and the role played by Taiwanese 
subsidiaries and their overall performance (Chang et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2013; Chiao and 
Ying 2013).  
To fill this gap in the literature, we present case studies of two Chinese subsidiaries operating 
in Spain that provide valuable information about how they resolve the isomorphic conflict 
(Forsgren 2013), by seeking internal and external legitimacy at the subsidiary level. Thus, the 
main contribution of this paper is to illustrate the way in which deep-rooted Chinese values 
and practices, especially guanxi, play a significant role in the subsidiaries to balance pressures 
from both the home- and host-environments. 
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the extent of the 
presence of Chinese EMNEs in Spain. Then, we examine the main theoretical arguments 
concerning the institutional and cultural features of Chinese subsidiaries. Section 4 discusses 
the research methods employed here. In the fifth section, we present our analyses and the 
results of our case studies of Chinese subsidiaries. Finally, we discuss our findings and 
identify both the limitations of this paper and future avenues of research. 
Presence of Chinese EMNEs in Spain 
Among its Asian partners, China has recently become the key player in the world economy in 
terms of FDI. Despite the ongoing slowdown in China, with an economy that is expected to 
grow at 6.3% in 2016 compared to 7.3% in 2014 (IMF 2016), the country is set to continue its 
investments in the most developed countries, thus playing a major role in the FDI arena. 
Spain is the 9
th 
largest destination for Chinese FDI among the EU-27 countries, behind the 
United Kingdom, Germany and France (Rhodium 2015). Indeed, Spain’s position as a 
recipient of Chinese investment has grown rapidly in recent years. According to the Spanish 
Foreign Investment Registry (DataInvex)
1
, the evolution of Chinese FDI in Spain accelerated 
dramatically from 2008 onwards, increasing from 26 to 610 million EUR between 2010 and 
2014 (see Table 1). In just a few years, China rose to second place in the rankings behind only 
Mexico, having occupied a distant 19
th
 place in 2009. This rapid growth means that today 
                                                          
1
 DataInvex is an official database recording all FDI in Spain since 1993. To eliminate any speculative capital 
movements that might blur our interpretation of this FDI, flows received by entities holding foreign securities 
were excluded from the analysis. Additionally, investments were included only by the ‘last country of origin’, as 
this is where the last owner of the investment resides. This approach is more reliable than including the 
investments by the ‘immediate country of origin’, since this might be a mere country of transit for tax reasons.  
The emerging countries included in our study are Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Korea (South Korea), 
Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
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China accounts for 5% of Spain’s total FDI inflows, when barely four years ago it represented 
just 0.42%. In terms of stock, China is also second only to Mexico, overtaking in a very short 
period of time the United Arab Emirates, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Argentina and South Korea, 
which had been the emerging countries that invested most heavily in Spain. 
Table 1. Spain’s FDI inflows from China and Hong Kong (2007-2014) 
 
Source: Spanish Foreign Investment Registry (DataInvex) 
We identified 86 Chinese capital firms in Spain in 2013 in the SABI database
2
. These 
subsidiaries represent 6.14% of employees, 4.70% of operating revenue and 2.27% of assets 
of all the EMNEs with a direct presence in Spain (see Table 2). In terms of mean size, 
Chinese firms have caught up with their counterparts in other emerging Asian countries, 
including Korea. Therefore, among the many emerging countries included in this study, China 
is increasingly establishing itself as a highly relevant player in Spain. However, if we 
compare Chinese MNEs located in Spain with their counterparts from other developed 
countries, they still represent just a small fraction. This is in line with the data described 
above for Chinese outflows from the country. Indeed, the vast majority of Chinese 
                                                          
2
 The SABI database (Iberian Balance Sheets Analysis System) includes financial data from more than 2,000,000 
Spanish companies. The firms selected in our sample had to be subsidiaries in which at least 50.01% of their 
capital belonged to MNEs from the emerging countries selected. Note, we do not differentiate between 
investments from China and Hong Kong, given that Hong Kong serves as an important bridge for Chinese firms 
wishing to venture overseas (Aminian et al. 2008), providing a platform for tax purposes and allowing them to 
avoid Chinese Government regulations (Ramasamy et al. 2012). Besides, given Hong Kong’s role in round-
tripping, we have sought to exclude investments from developed economies or other foreign countries. 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
China (Total EUR million) 2.16  1.05  2.85  26.41  62.16  141.68  526.54  610.31  
Hong Kong (Total EUR million) 2.61  0.26  1.12  25.58  5.22  40.33  241.16  245.20  
China and Hong Kong (Total EUR 
million) 
4.78  1.30  3.97  51.99  67.38  182.01  767.70  855.50  
China and Hong Kong as Asian emerging 
countries (%) 
0.77 0.94 5.15 46.54 62.56 29.92 90.80 64.77 
China and Hong Kong as total emerging 
countries (%) 
0.27 0.30 0.10 12.31 7.86 13.37 36.33 25.09 
China and Hong Kong as total foreign 
countries (%) 
0.02 0.00 0.03 0.42 0.27 1.24 4.56 4.69 
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subsidiaries featured only established in Spain from 2007 onwards. Consequently, the 
Chinese presence in Spain is a nascent phenomenon, particularly when compared with FDI 
from developed economies. 
Table 2. Comparison: Chinese subsidiaries and other foreign MNE subsidiaries in Spain (2013) 





























Companies Absolute values 86 247 700 15,906 34.82 12.29 0.54 
Employees 
Absolute values 3,618 11,186 58,920 1,320,213 
32.34 6.14 0.27 
Average values 50 60 127 137 
Operating 
revenue* 
Absolute values 2,911 8,323 61,988 481,106 
34.98 4.70 0.61 
Average values 37 41 119 42 
Total Assets* 
Absolute values 1,795 5,150 78,974 785,389 
34.85 2.27 0.23 
Average values 23 25 140 65 
*Absolute values in EUR million 
Source: Based on data taken from SABI 
Chinese firms operate mainly in the services sector, 77.91%, compared to 19.77% in 
manufacturing industries
3
. Within the services sector, most companies operate in less 
knowledge-intensive activities (83.58%) as wholesale traders of a diverse range of products 
(electronic, chemical and different types of industrial materials), while the remaining Chinese 
firms (16.42%) operate in knowledge-intensive sectors, such as financial or technical 
activities (Table 3). As for those operating in the industrial sector, a high proportion of 
Chinese EMNEs work in medium-low-technology industries (52.94%), such as metal 
products. However, a fairly large proportion operates in medium-high-technology industries 
(41.18%), such as chemical or machinery and equipment manufacturing.  
Table 3. Classification of Chinese subsidiaries in Spain by level of technology and knowledge 
intensity (2013) 
                                                          
3
 To analyse these companies at the sector level, we opted to apply Eurostat (2011) criterion. This approach leads 
to a classification based on different levels of technology and knowledge intensity of the vast range of economic 
activities. Thus, services are divided into knowledge intensive and less-knowledge intensive, and manufacturing 
industries comprise high technology, medium-high technology, medium-low technology and low technology. 
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 Companies % 
Industries without technological classification (fishing, electricity) 2 2.33 
Manufacturing industries 17 19.77 
  Medium-high-technology  (manufacture of chemicals and chemical products, machinery and 
equipment, electrical equipment) 
7 41.18 
  Medium-low-technology (manufacture of fabricated metal products, basic metals, rubber and 
plastic products, other non-metallic mineral products, repair and installation of machinery and 
equipment) 
9 52.94 
   Low-technology (manufacture of beverages) 1 5.88 
Services 67 77.91 
   Less-knowledge-intensive services (wholesale trade - except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles, warehousing and support activities for transportation, retail trade - except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles, wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles, office administrative and other business support activities) 
56 83.58 
   Knowledge-intensive services (management consultancy activities, financial service activities, 
activities auxiliary to financial services, architectural and engineering activities, information 
service activities, cultural activities) 
11 16.42 
TOTAL 86 100.00 
 Source: Based on data taken from SABI and Eurostat 
If we examine the degree of diversification of Chinese EMNEs in Spain, half the subsidiaries 
(51.16%) are active in just one sector, preferring to focus their efforts on just one business and 
tending not to diversify
4
. Among diversified subsidiaries (48.84%), 17 firms (19.77%) have 
opted for a relational diversification strategy, while the remaining 29.07% have opted in 
favour of non-relational diversification. This latter strategy is a typical characteristic of 
EMNEs (Khanna and Palepu 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra 2007).  
An analysis of the capital ownership of Chinese subsidiaries in Spain reveals a degree of 
balance between public and private equity firms. While 52 firms (60.47%) are wholly owned 
by private investors, the remaining 34 companies (39.53%) are state-owned enterprises 
                                                          
4
 In line with Hitt et al. (1997) to measure the degree of diversification we adopt the following criteria: a firm 
presents no diversification if it does not have a secondary NACE classification; a firm implements a relational 
diversification strategy if it has a secondary NACE that differs from its primary NACE at the three-digit level 
and which is equal at the two-digit level; finally, a firm presents non-relational diversification if its secondary 
NACE differs from its primary at both the two- and three-digit levels. 
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(SOEs). In general, the Spanish subsidiaries of SOEs tend to be larger than privately owned 
enterprises, with a few exceptions, including Hutchison, Huawei and Lenovo. 
Half the Chinese subsidiaries do not engage in any form of international commerce (32.6%) 
or are involved solely in the import trade (17.4%). This might indicate that their primary 
motive for investing in Spain is market-seeking (ESADE 2014, Nicolas 2014). In contrast, the 
other half does operate an export business (with 12.8% engaged just in exports and 37.2% in 
exports and imports). As such, their presence in Spain extends beyond the seeking of new 
market opportunities and these Chinese EMNEs consider Spain a channel for accessing 
adjacent markets as well as for acquiring strategic assets.              
Theoretical framework 
 
The success of EMNEs in advanced countries challenges present FDI paradigms. The 
traditional theories that explain the activities of MNEs, and which were originally developed 
using empirical evidence from advanced economies, may be insufficient to account for the 
experiences of EMNEs (Buckley et al. 2007; Child and Rodrigues 2005; Gaffney et al. 2014; 
Guillén and García-Canal 2009; Mathews 2002-2006; Ramamurti 2009). As a result, in recent 
years diverse EMNE-specific FDI theoretical perspectives have emerged (see Matthews 2006; 
Luo and Tung 2007; Luo and Rui 2009), which seek to explain the internationalization of 
EMNEs as a process for acquiring globally competitive resources and capabilities. These 
perspectives suggest that EMNEs differ from traditional multinationals in one key respect: 
their accelerated pace of internationalization. In order to expand more rapidly they sometimes 
prefer to enter developed markets first using cross-border acquisitions rather than to enter 
other similar developing economies (Luo and Tung 2007). By so doing, EMNEs can quickly 
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acquire the strategic assets required to compete more effectively against global rivals at home 
and abroad, while avoiding institutional and market constraints. 
Among the many emerging countries, China is the most active in outward FDI (MOFCOM 
various). In 2014, China and Hong Kong alone accounted for 48% of the emerging 
economies’ FDI outflows, 41% of stock and 64% of the value of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) (UNCTAD 2015). In contrast to the FDI from developed countries and 
from other emerging economies, Chinese FDI presents a number of distinctive characteristics. 
On the one hand, the main motivation of Chinese EMNEs is the opportunity to expand their 
market share in other host economies (see Luo and Tung 2007). This is confirmed by various 
econometric tests conducted on Chinese investment patterns (Buckley et al. 2007; Kolstad 
and Wiig 2012). According to Nicolas (2014), the European Union is no exception and 
market seeking is found to be the main motivation for Chinese investment, with strategic asset 
seeking being ranked second. Indeed, Chinese MNEs are especially interested in acquiring 
natural resources and superior managerial and marketing skills in order to improve their 
competitive advantage in manufactured products (Chen 2008; Cui and Jiang 2010; Deng 
2009; Rui and Yip 2008; Nicholson and Salaber 2013; Wang et al. 2012). 
However, the Chinese government plays a major role in its MNEs and its state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) dominate the scene. Before 2004, private firms were not permitted to 
invest overseas and access to foreign exchange was allowed only to approved SOEs 
(Ramasamy et al. 2012). Thus, Chinese SOEs have been the main driver of the country’s FDI, 
accounting for more than two thirds of total Chinese FDI worldwide (MOFCOM various; 
Morck et al. 2008). Given this legacy of institutional dependence, Chinese FDI projects today 
continue to be subject to governmental approval (Child and Rodrigues 2005) as it seeks to 
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ensure that investments are made in line with its resource allocation plans and priorities and 
that they reinforce China’s global influence (Luo et al. 2010). For this reason, the government 
monitors all foreign exchange outflows and all firms are required to report data to their 
corresponding provincial Bureau of Commerce (Hong et al. 2015). The Chinese government 
strongly encourages outward FDI in those sectors considered a priority and these firms 
receive greater backing in terms of organizational support, access to capital and other key 
inputs than their counterparts in sectors where FDI is not a priority (Ramasamy et al. 2012; Si 
and Liefner 2014). 
Given the active role played by the Chinese government in the FDI processes, institutional 
theory (North 1990; Scott 1995) provides a good explanation of its overseas investments, 
highlighting the marked differences in the institutional frameworks of the emerging and 
developed economies. Indeed, several authors stress this perspective in seeking to understand 
the EMNE phenomenon (Gaffney et al. 2013; Wei et al. 2015). For example, Peng et al. 
(2008) argue that the institution-based view constitutes, along with the industry- and resource-
based views, the third leg of the EMNE strategy tripod. Institutions are “the humanly devised 
constraints that structure human interaction” (North 1990), and according to Scott (1995) they 
can be conceptualized as a set of three pillars (regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive)
5
. 
These three elements generate isomorphic pressures that may either encourage or constrain 
the behaviour of a subsidiary in a host-environment, thus affecting the firm’s legitimacy in 
that setting (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995), where legitimacy refers to “actors’ 
perceptions of the organization, as a judgment with respect to the organization, or as the 
                                                          
5
 The regulative pillar consists of formal institutions and related rule systems, such as laws and regulations as 
well as State-sanctioned enforcement mechanisms. The normative pillar comprises institutions, such as 
professional societies, that specify roles and guidelines for their members. The cultural-cognitive pillar consists 
of the shared social beliefs and values of a society’s culture. 
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behavioural consequences of perception and judgment, manifested in actors’ actions—
‘acceptance, endorsement, and so forth’” (Bitektine 2011). As such, firms achieve legitimacy 
by means of becoming isomorphic as a result of their adopting practices and structures that 
are institutionalized in a certain environment (Kostova et al. 2008).  
According to Wong (2012) adaptation to local institutional pressures is more challenging 
when having to contend with normative and cognitive differences than when facing regulative 
differences. While regulatory features tend to be more formalized and more widely accepted 
as a motive for local adaptation, norms and cognitive elements require intensive cross-cultural 
communication as they tend to be more difficult to grasp, and local knowledge is largely tacit 
(Boyacigiller et al. 2004). Moreover, the governments of emerging countries may influence 
the inclination of EMNEs to expand abroad by placing SOEs under regulative and normative 
pressures to accommodate political objectives and “wave the national flag” (Deng 2009; Peng 
et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2012). Thus, the pressures that SOEs face are great when they have to 
make their location decision and may not be relevant to their local adaptation in the host 
country. For these reasons, it is our contention that the cultural-cognitive pillar takes on 
considerable importance when these Chinese subsidiaries interact to become isomorphic in 
the host-environment. 
Given their distinctive institutional and social environments, Chinese MNEs face a 
considerable cultural distance when making cross-border acquisitions in Europe. The Chinese 
institutional environment is characterized primarily by a centralized, state-controlled, 
authoritarian culture (Hofstede 2001), and the importance of guanxi (the ancient system of 
personal relationships and social connections based on mutual interest and benefit) in business 
dealings (Hwang 1987; Kipnis 1997; Wang 2007; Yang, 1994). Basically, guanxi can be 
 
Volume 2, Number 1, 201-234, July-December 2016           doi.org/10.1344/JESB2016.2.j017 
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
212 
considered to comprise various elements, including renqing (similar to the owing of a 
‘favour’), ganqing (translated into English as ‘feelings’) and xinren (closely related to ‘trust’), 
which together are considered as reflecting the quality or strength of guanxi (Chen and Chen 
2004; Kipnis 1997; Wang 2007; Wang et al. 2008).  
Because of the cultural distance between their respective institutional environments, Chinese 
companies entering the European market for the first time face what is known as a ‘liability of 
foreignness’ (Buckley and Casson 1976; Hymer 1960, Zaheer 1995), a heavy burden that is 
not easily shed and which may result in additional costs for those firms that are new to a 
foreign market. The greater the cultural distance, the greater this liability of foreignness will 
be. According to Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997), there is a close link between the liability of 
foreignness and the need of legitimacy of foreign firms in different cultural and institutional 
environments. By entering a host country by means of an M&A, foreign firms seek to 
overcome their lack of local knowledge and these liabilities (Klossek et al. 2012).  
Additionally, the subsidiaries of EMNEs in developed countries not only have to achieve 
external legitimacy (i.e., the acceptance of local players in the host country), but also retain 
internal legitimacy (i.e., the adoption of the institutionalized practices of the parent company 
and conformity with its cultural values) (Kostova et al. 2008). These often diametrically 
opposed environments can simultaneously exert isomorphic pulls on foreign subsidiaries, in 
what has been described as an ‘isomorphic conflict’ (Forsgren 2013). This seems to be 
especially challenging for Chinese subsidiaries as their requisites of internal legitimacy can 
differ substantially from those of their external legitimacy, because of the great institutional 
distance between China and Europe. Therefore, a balance has to be struck between the two 
pressures in order to achieve the right levels of external and internal legitimacy and, so, 
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ensure the subsidiary’s success in the host country. In this context, subsidiary managers play a 
key role in adapting the multinational to the new institutional environment. Specifically, they 
have to promote the integration of the Chinese multinational within a distant institutional 
environment while, at the same time, seeking to understand guanxi practices so as to maintain 
good relations with their multinational corporation.  
Comparatively little research has been conducted to illustrate how Chinese subsidiaries 
struggle to adapt to their host-environment, and even less research has been devoted to 
examine how guanxi business practices are adapted to western business styles. Of the few 
existing studies, Si and Liefner (2014) introduced the concept of cognitive distance into the 
analysis of Chinese subsidiaries to study the knowledge gap that exists between parent and 
subsidiary; and, Wong (2012) analysed the difficulties faced by a Chinese SOE seeking to 
acquire a company in Australia due to institutional frictions and fear amongst the host 
population. Here, it is our contention that an exploration of the use of guanxi outside Chinese 
borders may help explain how a Chinese subsidiary in a developed country balances its need 
to manage globally (alignment of practices with parent organization culture) with its need to 
manage locally (conformity to institutional pressures of the host country) as it seeks to resolve 
issues of isomorphic conflict and achieve both internal and external legitimacy.  
Methods 
 
Given the current lack of understanding of the isomorphic conflict faced by Chinese 
subsidiaries in developed countries, we adopt a qualitative case study methodology to 
examine the cultural adaptation of Chinese subsidiaries to the host country. This is 
particularly apposite when seeking to further our understanding of a phenomenon employing 
an inductive approach, since it allows us to address more fully the complexity of the problem, 
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the nature of the context and the behaviour of the agents involved and the relations between 
them (Gummesson 2006).  
The case study includes two Chinese subsidiaries based in Spain. The selection of these two 
cases fulfils the criteria of theoretical sampling, given that they were chosen for their 
relevance and expected contribution to the objectives of the research (Eisenhardt 1989). More 
specifically, the criteria guiding the choice of the two subsidiaries were: (1) they had to be 
state-owned enterprises, since the government has considerable influence over Chinese 
MNEs; (2) both service and manufacturing industries had to be represented; (3) they had to be 
located in the same geographical area, so that they enjoyed the same opportunities for 
integrating within the local environment and establishing guanxi connections; and finally (4) 
they had to be managed by both local and expatriates managers, so that they were exposed to 
similar cognitive differences. Table 4 provides an overview of the two companies selected 
and their basic characteristics. 
Table 4. Characteristics of the two subsidiaries 
Organisation  Year of 
entry into 
Spain 




Spain Agency, SL 
1999 Service Public shipping agency, 
international freight 
forwarding and related 
extension services, with 
its headquarters in 
Shanghai. 
Barcelona General Manager 
Huayi Compressor 
Barcelona, SL 













The data were collected through in-depth, personal, semi-structured interviews (conducted 
between April and November 2015) that lasted approximately three hours. Meetings were 
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held with local managers of the Chinese subsidiaries (see Table 4). These informants were 
selected on the basis of their being directly involved in the integration process of the 
subsidiary within Spain, their close relationship with Chinese managers both in the subsidiary 
and the MNE, and their first-hand knowledge of the subsidiary’s guanxi practices. 
The interviews were structured in two blocks in accordance with a predetermined script based 
on a review of the literature: the objective of the first block was to obtain an overview of the 
firm’s entry strategy and development, the difficulties encountered in integrating within the 
host institutional environment and the dynamics associated with their strategies and 
interactions with the parent office. In the second block, respondents were asked to describe 
the dynamics associated with the subsidiary’s guanxi practices, the motives for applying them 
in Spain and the way in which this was achieved. 
Once the data had been collected we began our analysis by processing all the information and 
filtering out any irrelevant content. All the interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded in 
order to structure the data and to make sure that they could be reassessed if inconsistencies 
were found. We used narrative techniques to construct the story of the Chinese subsidiaries in 
Spain from their arrival to the present day. Subsequently, we identified the three component 
elements making up guanxi (that is, renqing, ganqing and xinren) based on the conceptual 
framework provided by Yen et al. (2011) and Wang (2007). Any inaccuracies identified were 
resolved through mail exchange and direct phone calls. 
These data was triangulated with information taken from complementary sources. We 
contrasted our results by conducting three in-depth, personal interviews with Chinese FDI 
experts holding positions of responsibility in local public organisms. Specifically, we met 
with the business intelligence director of Acció-Invest in Catalonia (Government of 
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Catalonia), the city promotion advisor of Barcelona Activa for the Asian region (Barcelona 
City Council) and the economic manager of Casa Asia. These official organisations are 
responsible for attracting FDI to Spain and so they are also actively involved and have an in-
depth understanding of Chinese investment processes. 
Results 
Entry strategies: motivations and entry mode  
The entry strategies of the two Chinese MNEs in Spain are similar despite the 14-year gap 
separating the two experiences. China Shipping entered the Spanish market in 1999 via a 
joint-venture with Pérez y Cía. The main purpose of this local alliance was to promote the 
commercial interests of China Shipping Group in Spain, whereby the local company serves as 
the consignee of the Chinese shipping company in the port of Barcelona. In Spain, as in many 
other countries, the law of maritime traffic obliges shipping companies to operate in ports 
through local consignees that act as mediators with port authorities, performing custom duties 
and being responsible for loading and unloading cargo and all commercial activity in the host-
country. Thus, the entry of China Shipping Group into Spain was a strategic response to the 
barriers of entry (Dunning 1979) to the Spanish market protected as it was by the legislative 
requirements of maritime transit. The enterprise’s motivation to enter the market fits well with 
what Luo and Tung (2007) refer to as seeking new market opportunities for two reasons.   
First, China Shipping vertically integrates upstream activities by establishing its own 
consignee agencies in host-countries so as to achieve absolute control. According to the 
general manager of China Shipping Spain, “All the big shipping companies try to cover all 
activities of the value chain [fully integrated logistics, consignment and containerized 
transportation] to communicate better orders and meet with quality standards and 
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commitment requirements. It is the best way to impact on clients and capture the whole 
margin”. Second, the fact that market entry was overseen by a local partner alleviated the 
firm’s lack of knowledge of the Spanish environment and, at the same time, provided it with 
immediate access to strategic resources so that it could compete with its global rivals. As the 
general manager mentioned, “… it was a simultaneous process which they repeated around 
the world, they were looking for local partners to create companies, joint ventures, around 
the world…”. These comments provide evidence of an accelerated internationalization typical 
of EMNEs (see Luo and Tung 2007), often strengthened by the application of springboard 
strategies. Indeed, the introduction of the Chinese group in Spain was motivated in large 
measure by a springboard strategy, as “the country has an excellent image in Arab and Latin 
American countries […] and also the connections of the Spanish ports with Latin America 
and the Middle East are strategic”. 
In contrast, the FDI history of Huayi Compressor in Europe began just a few years ago in 
2013, when it took over a well-known Catalan company, Cubigel, in Sant Quirze del Vallès 
(Barcelona), which was experiencing financial problems. During almost three decades, 
Cubigel had been completely Catalan-owned, but in 1988 it joined the Swedish group, 
Electrolux Compressors. In the years that followed the firm changed hands several times:  in 
2003 it was acquired by the Italian group, ACC Appliances Components Companies; in 2009 
it was bought by the North American private equity firm, AIAC; and, then, in 2013 Huayi 
Compressor gained control. The acquisition of Cubigel by the Sichuan Changhong Group, a 
leader in consumer electronic products and appliances, was the Chinese company’s first 
incursion into manufacturing activity outside China. Huayi’s activity in Spain is closely 
linked to its operations in China; however, there are differences in the application of the 
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. Thus, while the subsidiary focuses its efforts on compressors for 
industrial and commercial refrigerators, the activity in China focuses on producing domestic 
compressors for home appliances. 
Huayi’s reasons for investing in Spain coincide in some respects with those of China 
Shipping. Thus, the firm was also seeking new market opportunities (Luo and Tung 2007), 
but here it not only targets the Spanish market but other adjacent markets too. Indeed, in 2014 
the Chinese subsidiary exported 98% of its production to European countries as well as to 
Turkey, Israel, Russia and Latin American. In this respect, Barcelona acts as a springboard 
subsidiary of Huayi activities to Latin America. As the HR manager reported: “We have sales 
agents exclusively devoted to Latin American markets who sell the products of both 
businesses (commercial and domestic compressors). For us, it is easier to sell there since we 
share the same language and culture”.   
However, unlike China Shipping, in this case access to technology acquired special relevance 
as a motivation for investing in Spain. Thus, the arrival of Huayi in Spain responded to the 
horizontal diversification of its business portfolio, which had previously been focused solely 
on domestic compressors, to include commercial/industrial compressors. Despite the shared 
technology of commercial and domestic compressors, the components have different 
specifications: first, technological characteristics, such as size, power and energy 
consumption, are more highly valued in industrial compressors than they are in domestic 
compressor; and, second, commercial elements, including, for example, the client profile, 
distribution methods and sales agents, differ considerably from domestic to industrial 
compressors. Consequently, new knowledge with regards to technology, operations, logistics, 
                                                          
6
 A compressor is a component of a vapor-compression refrigerating machine for engines, lowering the 
temperature of an enclosed space by removing heat from that space and transferring it elsewhere. 
 
Volume 2, Number 1, 201-234, July-December 2016           doi.org/10.1344/JESB2016.2.j017 
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
219 
suppliers and commercial activities was required. In addition, Barcelona boasts highly trained 
R&D personnel while China operates some of the most advanced laboratories and 
infrastructure in the world; therefore, mutual knowledge transfer is extensive and frequent. 
Indeed, the HR manager reported, “Exchanges between Chinese and Spanish engineers are 
very common in Huayi”.  
Institutional distance and liability of foreignness: isomorphic conflict  
Once Chinese investors are physically present in a developed market, they encounter a 
considerable cultural distance due to markedly different institutional and social environments. 
Despite choosing external entry modes (as illustrated by China Shipping Group and Sichuan 
Changhong) to overcome the liability of foreignness and to access local institutional 
knowledge, EMNEs face a major cultural clash, which makes the integration of their 
subsidiaries a highly complex affair. Chinese culture contrasts with Spanish culture in many 
respects; according to the general manager of China Shipping: “We are not only talking about 
the language problem as a major constraint to communication; gestures, manners and non-
verbal communication are also really difficult to understand … everything is new for both 
parties”.  At the outset, in both EMNEs, the Chinese managers had a poor command of 
English and spoke no Spanish, making language skills the most obvious manifestation of the 
liability of foreignness suffered at the subsidiary level. In China Shipping, despite the broad 
internationalization of the company group, corporate communications are still sent to foreign 
subsidiaries in Chinese. The general manager explained: “Translating letters and internal 
communications all the time implies a loss of time when it would be easier if everything was 
written from the beginning directly in English”. In Huayi, we observed that most Chinese 
expatriates consider the Chinese subsidiary a temporary destination, and so have little 
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motivation to learn Spanish given that they have no intention of staying in the country long. 
As the HR manager pointed out: “We roughly understand each other in English because they 
hardly speak Spanish”. A further obstacle for Chinese managers is attributable to problems of 
non-verbal communication. In fact, this mode of communication, which differs greatly in the 
two cultures, often hinders the exchange of views and, hence, the possibility of coming to a 
rapid understanding. In Huayi, the HR manager mentioned that: “The things that are very 
common for us are not so common for them; on the contrary, they do not assimilate certain 
modes of conduct that are quite distinct from their own forms of behaviour”. 
In addition to these communication barriers, other key factors highlight the distance between 
Chinese and Spanish cultures. One such factor is the great power distances that characterize 
Chinese MNEs, which means hierarchies can never be called into question (Hofstede 2001). 
Overall, the respect for the hierarchy and authority is an essential value in China Shipping 
Group. For instance, the general manager explained, “For Chinese managers it is difficult to 
understand that Spanish employees will not wear the same corporate T-shirt to work on 
casual Fridays, just because a top executive has come up with this idea”. Likewise, in the 
Sichuan Changhong firm, the vertical hierarchy and the horizontal organizational structure are 
clearly defined and cannot be transgressed. In relation to the vertical hierarchy, the HR 
manager reported: “It is a question of authority, you can never challenge a decision that 
comes from above. If your boss orders you to do something, however trivial it might seem, he 
expects you to stop the job you have in hand immediately and to do it without discussion”. 
These boundaries, moreover, are also very evident at the horizontal level. For instance, the 
scope of human resources management in European countries is much broader than in China 
(for a review see Cooke 2009). At Huayi, the HR staffs is actively involved in all functional 
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areas of the subsidiary, in line with western leadership styles; however, this clashes with 
perceptions of the role of HR management in Sichuan Changhong where functions are 
carefully delimited in just one department. Thus, they are forever saying “you are Human 
Resources, do not get involved in anything else”. 
Another important difference is the selflessness of Chinese workers. Unlike western 
employees, the Chinese have a high spirit of self-denial and are highly committed to their 
work. The general manager of China Shipping reported that: “In China there is no separation 
between life and work. For Chinese employees, work is more than work, it means their life 
and there are no borders between them. They are unable to say NO to work.” In a similar 
vein, the Huayi HR manager explained that “Chinese managers do not understand why 
Spanish employees do not want to work at the weekend and why they do not consider working 
overtime as a great honour and as an opportunity to show the bosses how hard they work”. In 
contrast to China, European societies place great value on their free time and, hence, strive to 
find a good work-life balance. Thus, these two different points of view are evidence of 
conflicting isomorphic pressures that are likely to result in misunderstandings.  
Finally, the degree of centralization of decision-making at the multinational level is a further 
factor that reflects the marked power distances in Chinese culture (Hofstede 2001) and which 
gives rise to the evident subordination of the Chinese subsidiaries. It should be noted that this 
relationship is further strengthened in the case of SOEs. Consequently, our two Chinese 
subsidiaries have very little room for manoeuvre. In this respect, the general manager of 
China Shipping reported: “We receive very clear guidance regarding how to work, how to 
report and how to proceed. We only have some leeway in aspects associated with the links 
established with local authorities, human resources and national suppliers and sales issues”. 
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Likewise, the HR manager of Huayi noted: “We have zero autonomy. In the Chinese 
subsidiary everybody does what the general manager says, and the general manager only 
does what the parent company orders”. Contrary to this approach, a European management 
style advocates the creation of more horizontal relations where the power distance between a 
group’s companies is not so obvious. Here again, there is a risk of isomorphic conflict due to 
the differences between the two environments and the great cultural distance that separates 
them. All in all, these circumstances highlight the difficulties the Chinese expatriate managers 
face in adapting to the host-country. Although these managers are willing to adapt for the sake 
of the subsidiary’s performance, their deep-rooted cultural values prevent them from full 
integration into the new environment. In the words of Huayi’s HR manager “Although 
Chinese managers are open to adaptation, their habits and values are so different and well 
established that when they come back from China, after a long time, you have to remind them 
and explain it to them again and again”. Once again, these differences between the two 
cultures accentuate the isomorphic conflict which has to be tackled in order to facilitate 
understanding.  
Mitigating isomorphic conflict  
The differences characterizing the two institutional environments, that is, the specific 
requirements for achieving both external and internal legitimacy, make cultural integration a 
great challenge. In their awareness of this, parent companies typically appoint mixed Chinese 
and Spanish subsidiary boards of directors. For example, in the case of Huayi, while the board 
is predominantly Chinese, the managers of the R&D and sales departments are Spanish, while 
in the case of China Shipping, although the board of directors is made up primarily of Spanish 
managers, the Managing Director and Financial Controller are Chinese. Similar evidence has 
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been reported by Si and Liefner (2014) and Klossek et al. (2012) in Germany, who likewise 
report the existence of mixed teams.  
In China Shipping, the Spanish managers play a key role as enablers of the adaptation of 
Chinese expatriates, acting as a bridge between the local way of behaving (embedded in 
relationships with local agents) and the parent office’s values (embodied in the Chinese 
expatriates). In this regard, the general manager explained: “We have to remind Chinese 
managers that they have no choice other than to adapt to certain cultural or legal norms if 
they want to operate with success in Spain”. In order to ensure adaptation, local subsidiary 
managers have to make great efforts to understand the will and actions of Chinese expatriates 
and, at the same time, teach them which procedures are welcome in the new environment and 
which are not. Moreover, local subsidiary managers also have the responsibility to learn from 
the Chinese culture and its values and to transfer an awareness of them to the local 
employees. According to the manager of China Shipping Spain: “We try to transfer Chinese 
customs and modes of conduct to our local employees. We celebrate the Chinese New Year, 
we hold dinners together […] We try to transfer all this information and at the same time we 
also try to communicate to them our habits, customs and Spanish ways of behaving […] all 
this is very different for them”. 
A useful way to approach Chinese cultural values is via the adoption of guanxi – the ancient 
system of personal relationships and social connections based on mutual interest and benefit 
(Hwang 1987; Kipnis 1997) and one of the more deep-seated business practices in China – by 
local subsidiary managers. In the cases analysed, local subsidiary managers are encouraged to 
promote guanxi in their local relations so as to give a Chinese meaning to their actions, to 
increase their legitimacy in the eyes of expatriate managers and to win the favour of the 
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parent company. However, to avoid becoming overly detached from their Spanish 
environment, they must at the same time adapt guanxi, as far as it is possible, to the local 
requirements of business relationships. We found that both Chinese subsidiaries seek to 
implement the three components of guanxi identified above (i.e., renqing, xinren and 
ganqing) in their attempts to respond to different institutional forces and, in short, as a vehicle 
to resolve the isomorphic conflict. 
For Chinese managers, reciprocity and empathy are essential for the success of their 
commercial relationships (Hwang 1987), which are based on the continuous exchange of 
favours (renqing).  Although it would seem that these principles form part of the universal 
language of business, in China personalized networks of influence, largely based on 
understanding and long-lasting linkages, constitute an especially strong guiding principle. As 
explained by the local subsidiary managers interviewed here, the subsidiaries have 
internalized these ways of proceeding and adhere to these rules of favours. In the case of 
China Shipping, “If you have a good commercial relationship it is normal to do favours in a 
business context; however, the Chinese have a longer conception of time due to the social 
beliefs of Confucianism. You are under no obligation to return the favour immediately, on the 
contrary, years may pass until you pay back the favour”. According to Huayi’s manager, “In 
business, you have to take care of your commercial networks and knit good relationships with 
customers. That sometimes implies doing favours. Nevertheless, Chinese businessmen never 
forget. If somebody owes you a favour, even if it was a long time ago, you expect it to be 
returned”.  
As a matter of fact, in the Chinese culture, the exchange of favours often transcends business 
dealings into personal relationships. Here, the relationships forged between Chinese expatriate 
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and Spanish managers acquire particular prominence. For example, we found evidence in 
both companies of local subsidiary managers solving the day-to-day problems of their 
Chinese counterparts. “They usually ask you if you can introduce them to a person of interest 
to them or help them with a personal matter … anyway, Chinese managers tend to rely on 
us”, explained the general manager of China Shipping. In this way, over time, by means of 
repeated favours, a useful channel of communication is opened up between the Spanish 
managers and the Chinese expatriates. In other words, Spanish managers have learnt to 
successfully apply the guanxi code of conduct in their dealings with Chinese expatriates and 
have, thus, built strong relationships of trust. 
The essence of any business relationship for a Chinese manager is continuous and repeated 
evidence of trust. Only over time and with the achievement of good outcomes is it possible to 
gain credibility (xinyong) and, so, build the bases of mutual trust and confidence (xinren) 
(Yen et al. 2011). In this respect, the general manager of China Shipping claims: “Trust is a 
basic aspect of successful professional relationships, but for the Chinese it is much greater 
than this. It is very difficult to enter in their circle of trust; you have to gain it day by day, 
gradually, by demonstrating good results. In that sense, the Spanish subsidiary has won 
considerable credibility within the Chinese MNC, obtaining better quality indicators than 
those obtained by other European subsidiaries”. And he adds: “Once you have eventually 
won their confidence it becomes a much deeper friendship than others”.  
Therefore, it is not until Spanish managers manage to win the confidence of Chinese 
expatriates that they can enter into their closed circle and develop friendly ties, thus increasing 
understanding between Chinese expatriates and local employees and fostering cultural 
integration. To this end, local managers also take great care in getting Chinese managers 
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emotionally involved (ganqing) with the Chinese subsidiary by promoting regular social 
interactions. For instance, the general manager of China Shipping reported, “In order to work 
properly with Chinese managers you have to respect and show interest in their culture and 
life style. Going out for dinners, tasting Chinese food or going singing are things that you 
must do to be kind and make things work”. In a similar vein, Huayi’s HR manager noted: 
“Huayi shows great concern for its employees, giving them many gifts on different occasions 
(fruit, wine, ‘jamón serrano’, chocolates, etc.). The intention is to get them involved and to be 
grateful to the firm”. He added, “Huge meals, toasts of friendship and football matches 
between the Spanish and Chinese take place often. Since the Chinese managers are a long 
way from their country and families, they feel the need to make friends here”. This common 
ground serves as a ‘social glue’ for the sharing of experiences and for learning more about 
each other’s culture, prompting mutual adaptation and resolving isomorphic conflicts 
(Forsgren 2013). 
Thus, thanks to the efforts of the Spanish managers and their attempts at promoting guanxi 
practices a mutual adaptation and rapprochement of cultures that facilitate understanding can 
be achieved. Indeed, by balancing these two forces, Chinese subsidiaries attain both internal 
and external legitimacy. In this context, and given the great cultural distance between China 
and Spain, Spanish managers have to be very careful to manage in accordance with the parent 
company’s culture (internal legitimacy) without neglecting local requirements (external 
legitimacy) if they want to guarantee the success of the investment in the host country. In 
short, our results indicate that the greater the institutional distance between the MNE’s home 
country and the subsidiary’s host country, the more the subsidiary will seek to adapt the 
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parent office’s practices to the host country environment in an attempt at resolving the 
isomorphic conflict. 
Conclusions and future research 
Our findings show that, in line with the growth in global FDI from emerging countries, 
Chinese direct investment in Spain has experienced an upward trend in the last decade, above 
all during the period of international financial crisis. The phenomenon remains new and is 
relatively small compared to the investment of multinationals based in developed countries; 
however, there is evidence that it is set to become more and more important in the future, 
despite the forecasts of a slowdown in the China economy.  
Much of the success of Chinese FDI in Southern Europe is attributable to the integration of 
cultures in contexts where the distance between the respective institutional environments is 
great (Kostova and Zaheer 1999) and the way in which they go about resolving their 
isomorphic conflicts (Forsgren 2013). In this respect, previous research has highlighted the 
significance of the Chinese tradition of guanxi and its widespread use in Chinese society (see, 
for example, Hwang 1987; Yang 1994; Lee and Dawes 2005; Huang et al. 2010). However, to 
date little has been written about how Chinese firms interact with the cultures of their host-
environments and how they deal with guanxi in foreign countries. In that sense, this article 
goes some way to filling this gap through its analysis of two Chinese subsidiaries located in 
Spain.  
Our results show that guanxi is in widespread use beyond the borders of China too. Although 
Chinese expatriates are fully aware of their liability of foreignness in developed markets 
precisely because of the marked cognitive-cultural distance between both environments, they 
are unable to discard guanxi practices as they are deeply-rooted in the Chinese way of doing 
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business and, moreover, they do not wish to jeopardise headquarters’ confidence in them as 
most hope to take up a position there on their return home.  
This being the case, foreign subsidiaries adopt and adapt guanxi practices, insofar as this is 
permitted by the institutional environment of the host country. Local subsidiary managers 
play a role in converting the guanxi practices of Chinese expatriates in legitimate actions in 
relation to the rest of the local employees and local actors, including suppliers, customers and 
the public administration. To do so, Spanish managers have to involve themselves in guanxi 
practices in order to win the confidence of Chinese expatriates. It should be noted that without 
the rapprochement of cultures that facilitates mutual understanding, the communication 
channel between the two parties would remain quite ineffectual for transferring knowledge 
and resolving the isomorphic conflict (Forsgren 2013).  
The adaptation of guanxi practices to the local cultural environment can act as a ‘social glue’, 
allowing the subsidiary to align itself with the culture of the parent organization at the same 
time as it embeds itself in the host environment. Indeed, the subsidiary has to strive to achieve 
this balance between home- and host-country institutional contexts by adapting guanxi 
practices to local requirements. Within this process of isomorphic conflict resolution, local 
subsidiary managers take on a key role in the success of Chinese FDI in developed countries. 
They act as a bridge, reducing the cultural-cognitive distance by transferring mutual 
knowledge between the host’s institutional environment and that of the corporation. Here, we 
have highlighted the fact that adapting guanxi practices to the context of a developed country, 
such as Spain, is essential in enabling Chinese subsidiaries to balance their need to manage 
globally (in accordance with their parent organization’s culture and, hence, to ensure their 
internal legitimacy) with the need to manage locally (in accordance with the social beliefs and 
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values of the host country and, hence, to ensure their external legitimacy) (see Figure 1). In 
short, this study provides additional insights to the guanxi literature by exploring how Chinese 
MNEs, and in particular their western subsidiaries, adjust their guanxi practices outside China 
in order to resolve the isomorphic conflict.       
Figure 1. Conceptual framework 
 
Finally, we need to acknowledge certain limitations of the present study, which in all 
circumstances provide clear indications for future research. First, in our analysis we have only 
examined the point of view of local managers of Chinese subsidiaries. The present results 
would undoubtedly be greatly enriched by integrating the opinions of Chinese expatriates as 
well as those of members sitting on the boards of directors back at the Chinese headquarters. 
These additional perspectives would provide us with a more complete vision of cultural 
integration. Second, as in other studies based on a sample of just two firms, our results cannot 
be generalized. In that sense, a broader sampling of Chinese subsidiaries in other countries of 
Southern Europe is needed. Finally, we have opted to focus solely on Chinese FDI; however, 
extending the research to include other emerging countries would enable us to compare the 
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legitimacy-seeking behaviour of EMNEs in developed markets. Indeed, a quantitative study 
would further mitigate this limitation by enabling us to test hypotheses related to the resolving 
of isomorphic conflicts via cultural adaptation and the achievement of internal and external 
legitimacy. 
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